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At least two distinct modeling frameworks contribute to the view that mind and 
brain are Bayesian: Bayesian Rational Analysis (BRA) and Hierarchical Predictive 
Coding (HPC). What is the relative contribution of each, and how exactly do they 
relate? In order to answer this question, we compare the way in which these 
two modeling frameworks address different levels of analysis within Marr’s tri-
partite conception of explanation in cognitive science. Whereas BRA answers 
questions at the computational level only, many HPC-theorists answer questions 
at the computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels simultaneously. 
Given that all three levels of analysis need to be addressed in order to explain a 
behavioral or cognitive phenomenon, HPC seems to deliver more complete ex-
planations. Nevertheless, BRA is well-suited for providing a solution to the dark 
room problem, a major theoretical obstacle for HPC. A combination of the two 
approaches also combines the benefits of an embodied-externalistic approach to 
resolving the dark room problem with the idea of a persisting evidentiary border 
beyond which matters are out of cognitive reach. For this reason, the develop-
ment of explanations spanning all three Marrian levels within the general Bayes-
ian approach may require combining the BRA and HPC modeling frameworks.
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1  Introduction
Two methodologically distinct modeling frameworks contribute to the rising prominence of the view 
that the mind and brain are Bayesian. On the one hand, Bayesian Rational Analysis (BRA) is used in 
cognitive psychology to characterize behavioral and cognitive phenomena as forms of optimal proba-
bilistic inference (Anderson 1991; Griffiths et al. 2008; Oaksford 2001; Oaksford and Chater 2007). On 
the other hand, Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) is used in theoretical neuroscience to model 
information processing in the brain (Clark 2013; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013; Rao and Ballard 1999). 
Although both of these modeling frameworks are grounded in the formal tools and concepts of Bayes-
ian statistics, they differ with respect to their explanatory scope.1 In particular, they address different 
levels of analysis in David Marr’s tripartite conception of explanation in cognitive science (Marr 1982).
As is well-known, Marr argued that in order to “completely understand” the visual system, it must 
be analyzed at three distinct levels. Marr’s levels can be distinguished according to the different types 
of questions investigators are likely to ask about a particular cognitive system (see also McClamrock 
1991). The computational level is characterized by questions about what the system is doing, and why 
it is doing it. Questions of this kind can be answered by specifying mathematical functions that de-
scribe the system’s behavior, and by determining the extent to which these functions reflect relevant 
structures in the environment (Shagrir 2010). In contrast, the algorithmic level of analysis concerns 
questions about how the system does what it does—questions that can be answered by specifying 
1 Our focus is on BRA and HPC as frameworks, rather than on specific models developed within either one of these frameworks. Frameworks, in our 
understanding, provide tools to apply to certain phenomena, specify the particular kinds of parameters that are available for explanations, and pro-
vide methods for model-building. In Marrian terms, frameworks are akin to the languages in which answers to what-, why-, how- and/or where-ques-
tions are expressed, as well as the methods that are deployed to answer questions of each type. Models, in contrast, are akin to specific answers: they 
connect and set the available parameters in order to explain specific phenomena.
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the individual steps of an algorithm for computing or approximating the mathematical function that 
describes the system’s behavior. Finally, at the implementational level of analysis, questions are asked 
about where in the brain the relevant algorithms are actually realized, by identifying individual steps 
of the relevant algorithm with the activity of particular physical structures in the brain (Zednik 2017).
Ever since Marr applied this three-level scheme to the phenomenon of visual perception, it has 
served as a backdrop for comparing and evaluating the explanatory scope of modeling frameworks in 
cognitive science quite generally. Therefore, the first aim of the present discussion is to highlight the 
differences between the BRA and HPC modeling frameworks by illuminating them against this back-
drop. Specifically, it will be argued that whereas the BRA framework answers what- and why-questions 
and therefore speaks directly to Marr’s computational level, it is neutral concerning the algorithmic 
and implementational levels of analysis. In contrast, proponents of HPC are keen to address all three 
levels of analysis simultaneously (see also Harkness and Keshava 2017).
The second aim is to explore the relationship between the BRA and HPC modeling frameworks, 
and to suggest that even though HPC is broader in scope and might therefore be thought to supplant 
BRA, they in fact complement each other in mutually beneficial ways. On the one hand, HPC puts 
paid to the allegation that the general Bayesian approach “eschews mechanism altogether” (Jones and 
Love 2011, p.173), because it answers questions at the algorithmic and implementational levels of 
analysis in addition to the computational level. On the other hand, as we will show, BRA helps to 
address concerns related to the dark room problem (Clark 2013; Mumford 1992; Sims 2017), which 
has been thought to undermine the explanatory credentials of HPC. Additionally, a combination of 
the two approaches marries the benefits of an embodied-externalistic approach to resolving the dark 
room problem with the idea of a persisting evidentiary border. Because they complement one another 
in these ways, a combination of the Bayesian Rational Analysis and Hierarchical Predictive Coding 
modeling frameworks offers a promising avenue to full-fledged Bayesian explanations in cognitive 
science.
2  Bayesian Rational Analysis and the Computational Level
Bayesian approaches in cognitive science are motivated by the insight, often attributed to Hermann 
von Helmholtz, that many kinds of behavior and cognition can be viewed as solutions to problems of 
inference under uncertainty (von Helmholtz 1867). For example, perception can be viewed as a solu-
tion to the problem of inferring the cause of a particular sensation (“Was it a bird?”), and motor action 
might be viewed as a solution to the problem of selecting an adequate course of action (“Should I try 
to catch it?”). In line with Helmholtz’ insight, the aim of BRA is to formally characterize a cognitive 
system’s behavior as an optimal solution to a particular probabilistic inference task in the environ-
ment (Anderson 1991; Griffiths et al. 2008; Oaksford 2001; Oaksford and Chater 2007). To this end, 
proponents of BRA specify the probabilistic inference tasks in which cognitive systems appear to be 
engaged, formally characterize the environment in which these tasks are solved, and derive optimal 
solutions to those tasks according to the rules of probability theory, most notably among them Bayes’ 
rule:
We can consider the left side of this equation to be a formalization of Helmholtz’ insight: P(H|E) is 
the posterior probability of some hypothesis H (e.g. “It was a bird”), given evidence E that may speak 
either for or against it (e.g. “I saw a yellow beak”). The right side prescribes that the posterior probabil-
ity should depend on the prior probability P(H) that the hypothesis is true independent of the evidence 
(e.g. the probability of encountering birds in a given environment), as well as on the likelihood P(E|H) 
that evidence E will be available if H is in fact true (e.g. the salience of beaks) and the probability of 
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encountering evidence E independent of the truth of H. Notably, because natural environments are 
unpredictable and complex, real-world inference typically involves considering not just the probabili-
ty of a single hypothesis, but rather considering a distribution of probabilities over a space of compet-
ing hypotheses. Indeed, many different things could have caused the relevant sensation (e.g. a bird, a 
plane, Superman), and many different behavioral actions could be performed (e.g. catching, but also 
running, screaming, laughing maniacally).
The optimal solutions derived using Bayes’ rule closely approximate the behavioral data in a wide 
variety of behavioral and cognitive domains. Phenomena as varied as perceptual cue-combination 
(Ernst and Banks 2002), memory and categorization (Anderson 1991), judgment and decision mak-
ing (Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2006), sensorimotor learning (Körding and Wolpert 2004), reasoning 
(Oaksford 2001), and language learning (Xu and Tenenbaum 2007) can all be viewed as forms of 
optimal probabilistic inference in an uncertain environment.2 But what exactly is the explanatory 
import of this finding? The characterization of behavior and cognition as a form of optimal prob-
abilistic inference allows investigators to answer questions at Marr’s computational level of analysis 
(Jones and Love 2011; Oaksford 2001; Oaksford and Chater 2007; Zednik and Jäkel 2016; Harkness 
and Keshava 2017; cf. Bowers and Davis 2012). Specifically, it allows them to answer questions about 
what a cognitive system is doing, and why. In general, whereas an answer to a what-question is deliv-
ered by describing a system’s behavior, an answer to a why-question is delivered by demonstrating this 
behavior’s “appropriateness” with respect to the “task at hand” (Marr 1982: 24; see also: Shagrir 2010). 
BRA delivers on both counts. Regarding questions about what a system is doing, whenever an optimal 
solution is closely approximated by the behavioral data, the former provides an empirically adequate 
description of the latter. As for questions about why a system does what it does, there is a clear sense 
in which the system can be thought to behave as it does because that way of behaving is optimal in the 
sense prescribed by probability theory.3
The fact that BRA is purpose-built for answering what- and why-questions at the computational 
level distinguishes it from many other modeling frameworks in cognitive science. Traditional frame-
works such as classical computationalism and connectionism are designed to answer questions at the 
algorithmic level of analysis about how the relevant system does what it does, and to a lesser extent, 
questions at the implementational level about where in the brain the relevant structures and pro-
cesses are located. Put differently, whereas BRA is mostly concerned with describing behavioral and 
cognitive phenomena as well as with assessing their appropriateness with respect to some particular 
task environment, most other modeling frameworks in cognitive science are designed to describe the 
component parts, operations, and organization of the mechanisms responsible for these phenomena 
(Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Piccinini and Craver 2011). Because BRA remains neutral with respect 
to the algorithmic and implementational levels, however, it has been accused of “eschew[ing] mecha-
nism altogether” (Jones and Love 2011, p.173).
To what extent is BRA’s focus on the computational level and simultaneous neglect of mechanisms 
a virtue rather than a vice? Insofar as the computational level of analysis—and in particular, the an-
swering of why-questions—remains somewhat underappreciated (Marr 1982; Shagrir 2010), BRA is 
poised to make an important explanatory contribution: By providing formal answers to questions 
2 Investigators may also often find deviations from optimality, of course. Some theorists argue that such deviations show that real cognizers are not 
ideally rational in the Bayesian sense (Kwisthout and van Rooij 2013), and that the models developed in BRA should be considered normative models 
that set a benchmark on performance, rather than descriptive models thereof (Colombo and Series 2012). However, proponents of this modeling 
framework also regularly tweak their assumptions about the statistical structure of the environment until the model does in fact accommodate the 
data (Anderson 1991; Bowers and Davis 2012). In this way, they are often able to preserve the assumption that cognitive systems behave optimally in 
the sense prescribed by probability theory (for discussion see Zednik and Jäkel 2016).
3 Many proponents of BRA take themselves to be answering why-questions in this way (e.g. Griffiths et al. 2012; Oaksford and Chater 2007). Notably, 
in line with Marr’s own understanding of what it takes to answer why-questions, no appeal is made to ontogenetic or phylogenetic considerations. 
Although some commentators have argued that this way of answering why-questions is explanatorily deficient (Danks 2008), others have defended it 
(Shagrir 2010; Zednik and Jäkel 2016). Whether or not direct reference is made to a particular behavior’s ontogenetic or phylogenetic history, char-
acterizing it as an optimal solution might suggest “why natural selection might favor one mechanism rather than another” (Griffiths et al. 2012). 
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about what a cognitive system is doing, proponents of this modeling framework can attain a height-
ened understanding of the nature of cognition and behavior itself, including its mathematical struc-
ture. As for why-questions, BRA may be poised to contribute to our understanding of a particular 
behavior’s teleology and role in a containing environment (Griffiths et al. 2012; Oaksford and Chater 
2007)—despite the fact that questions remain about how teleological considerations factor into expla-
nation in cognitive science (Zednik 2017; cf. Danks 2008).
That said, in line with Marr’s three-level account, it would be a mistake to think that answering 
what- and why-questions is sufficient for the purposes of explaining a behavioral or cognitive phe-
nomenon. To wit, Jones and Love have recently argued that:
[I]t would be a serious overreaction simply to discard everything below the computational level. 
As in nearly every other science, understanding how the subject of study (i.e., the brain) operates 
is critical to explaining and predicting its behavior [… M]echanistic explanations tend to be better 
suited for prediction of new phenomena, as opposed to post hoc explanation. [...] Much can be 
learned from consideration of how the brain handles the computational challenge of guiding be-
havior efficiently. (Jones and Love 2011, p. 177)
In other words, the explanatory success of the general Bayesian approach arguably depends on the 
extent to which the computational-level insights delivered by BRA can be supplemented with insights 
into behavioral and cognitive mechanisms at the algorithmic and implementation levels of analysis.4 
Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement about how best to supplement the BRA mod-
eling framework so as to address questions at levels below the computational. Some investigators—
most notably proponents of the so-called Bayesian coding hypothesis (Knill and Pouget 2004; Ma et 
al. 2006)—have sought to identify probability distributions and Bayes’ rule with specific physical 
structures and processes in the brain. However, it would be a mistake to think that the answers BRA 
provides at the computational level impose significant constraints on the answers that may be given 
to questions at the algorithmic and implementational levels. As Marr himself has previously argued, 
“there is a wide choice available at each level, and the explication of each level involves issues that 
are rather independent of the other two” (Marr 1982, p. 25). Indeed, although the Bayesian coding 
hypothesis may yet be confirmed, the ability to describe behavior and cognition as a form of optimal 
probabilistic inference at the computational level does not require or even imply that the brain actually 
invokes Bayes’ rule to compute over probability distributions (Colombo and Series 2012; Maloney and 
Mamassian 2009). Perhaps for this reason, an increasing number of investigators instead co-opt tech-
niques from machine learning and artificial intelligence to develop biologically plausible algorithms 
that approximate optimal probabilistic inference without directly implementing either Bayes’ rule or 
probabilistic representations (e.g. Griffiths et al. 2015; Sanborn et al. 2010, cf. Kwisthout and van Roo-
ij 2013). However, there exist a great number of options, and few principled guidelines for how to 
choose between them (see Zednik and Jäkel 2016 for discussion). In general, therefore, despite the fact 
that the BRA modeling framework is useful for answering what- and why-questions at the computa-
tional level, it remains unclear how to proceed so as to develop full-fledged scientific explanations that 
span all three of Marr’s levels.
3  Hierarchical Predictive Coding: Complement or Alternative?
Although there may be many different ways in which to supplement the computational-level insights 
provided by BRA, it is worth considering one particularly prominent candidate: Hierarchical Predic-
tive Coding (HPC). HPC-theorists have developed a wide range of algorithms that exhibit a common 
4 Without such supplementation, it remains unclear how some form of abstract optimality on the computational level can be interpreted as teleolog-
ically apt at all. Teleology itself explains too little if it is not grounded in specific mechanism exposed to evolutionary pressure. Vice versa, specific 
mechanism may explain too little if not considered in the broader context of their place in a system within its ecological niche. 
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computational architecture: a hierarchy of processing stages, where each higher stage is tasked with 
predicting the state of the preceding stage, and where each lower stage forwards an error signal—a 
measure of a prediction’s accuracy—to the higher stage.5 At every stage in this hierarchy, Bayes’ rule 
is used (or approximated) to combine past predictions with error signals so as to result in the con-
struction of increasingly veridical representations of the world. Although these representations are 
typically used to infer the causes of perceptual stimuli (Rao and Ballard 1999), proponents of the HPC 
modeling framework have also argued that cognitive systems often “bring the world in line” by “seek-
ing or generating the sensory consequences that they (or rather, their brains) expect” (Clark 2013, p. 
186; see also: Friston 2005).
Whereas the BRA modeling framework can be used to formally characterize perception and action 
as forms of optimal probabilistic inference, HPC is used to develop algorithms that actually perform 
this kind of inference. That is, the algorithms developed within the HPC modeling framework can be 
viewed as potential answers to questions about how a particular cognitive system does what it does, 
i.e. as descriptions of the functional processes that contribute to that system’s behavior. Although 
much work has yet to be done to determine which (if any) of these algorithms actually constitute a 
correct answer—i.e. a true description of functional processes in our brains—the fact that answers to 
how-questions are being developed is often considered the central explanatory contribution of HPC 
(e.g., Spratling 2013).
Although the focus may be on the algorithmic level of analysis, many HPC-theorists also make 
it a point to address questions at the implementational level that ask where in the brain the relevant 
algorithms might be realized. To this end, they identify the particular steps of an HPC-algorithm, 
or elements of the general HPC-architecture, with particular neuronal structures or processes (e.g. 
Bastos et al. 2012). For example, the claim that perception and action depend on the propagation 
of predictions and error signals has motivated the search for specific neural pathways along which 
this two-way propagation could take place. In particular, Friston (Friston 2005, p. 829) proposes to 
identify such pathways in “functionally distinct subpopulations [of neurons]”. He suggests the deep 
pyramidal cells as the locus of error propagation, and the superficial pyramidal cells as pathways for 
transmitting expectations (see also: Friston 2009). In this way, in addition to answering how-questions 
at the algorithmic level of analysis, proponents of HPC also often seek to answer where-questions at 
the implementational level.
Insofar as HPC promotes the formulation of testable claims about the algorithms that are used to 
perform optimal probabilistic inference, and about the neural structures in which these algorithms are 
implemented, HPC and BRA might be thought to complement one another. Clark appears to suggest 
as much when he argues that:
[T]he hierarchical and bidirectional predictive processing story, if correct, would rather directly 
underwrite the claim that the nervous system approximates, using tractable computational strate-
gies, a genuine version of Bayesian inference. The computational framework of hierarchical predic-
tive processing realizes, using the signature mix of top-down and bottom-up processing, a robustly 
Bayesian inferential strategy, and there is mounting neural and behavioral evidence [...] that such a 
mechanism is somehow implemented in the brain. (Clark 2013, p. 189)
That said, although Clark espouses the idea that human and animal cognizers may in fact perform 
optimal probabilistic inference—the central claim of BRA—it is worth noting that he does not explicitly 
endorse the methods of BRA. Indeed, it is fair to question whether these methods provide explanatory 
insights that go beyond the ones delivered by HPC. Although answers to what- and why-questions at 
the computational level may not impose significant constraints on the algorithmic and implementa-
5 Friston (Friston 2010, p. 10) presents an overview of such algorithms. See also (Sims 2017) for a review and comparison of different interpretations 
of the HPC framework. 
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tional levels, the opposite may still be true. Algorithms always produce a particular output that can 
be measured or described. Therefore, an understanding of how a cognitive system does what it does 
should allow investigators to understand what that system is actually doing. Indeed, the algorithms 
used in the HPC modeling framework are known to compute or approximate optimal solutions to 
problems of probabilistic inference under uncertainty (Rao and Ballard 1999; Friston 2010). Thus, 
HPC-theorists agree with proponents of BRA that cognitive systems optimally solve probabilistic in-
ference tasks in their environments, but they arrive at this conclusion indirectly, via the algorithmic 
level, rather than directly, by considering the computational level itself. In this sense, the generic an-
swer to what-questions given by proponents of BRA is implicit in the answers given to how-questions 
by proponents of HPC.
In addition to answering what-questions, the HPC modeling framework also answers questions 
about why. Many HPC-theorists argue that cognitive systems behave as they do because that way of 
behaving leads to the minimization of prediction error (e.g. Clark 2013; Friston 2009; Friston 2010). 
At first glance, this may seem to differ from the generic way of answering why-questions in the BRA 
modeling framework, which appeals to the claim that cognitive systems behave as they do because 
that way of behaving is optimal with respect to the relevant task environment. Indeed, whereas HPC 
answers why-questions by looking at features internal to a particular system—the algorithms being 
deployed—BRA answers these questions by considering external features, namely the statistical struc-
ture of environment in which that system is situated. Still, HPC’s answers to why-questions entail the 
answers developed in BRA: prediction error will be minimized whenever Bayes’ rule is applied to 
update representations of the external world, and whenever cognitive systems act so as to “bring the 
world in line”. By minimizing prediction error in either one of these two ways, the system’s behavior 
inevitably approaches optimality in the sense prescribed by probability theory. Therefore, like the 
answers to what-questions, the answers to why-questions developed within the BRA modeling frame-
work are in fact entailed by the answers developed in HPC.
In summary, although the HPC modeling framework is most clearly directed at the algorithmic 
and implementational levels of analysis, it is also well-suited for answering questions at the computa-
tional level. Perhaps for this reason, while BRA is plagued by the accusation that it “eschews mecha-
nism” (Jones and Love 2011), HPC-theorists regularly present their approach as a unifying framework 
that is capable of simultaneously addressing all three levels of analysis (e.g. Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013). 
In this sense, the explanatory scope of HPC exceeds the scope of BRA. Not only that, the scope of 
HPC appears to fully subsume the scope of BRA. Because the answers given to computational-level 
questions by proponents of HPC entail the answers that would also be given by advocates of BRA, it is 
unclear what BRA’s own unique contribution actually is. Does HPC render BRA superfluous?
4  Meeting in the Dark Room
BRA can contribute to a unified Bayesian conception of the mind in several ways. We will mainly fo-
cus on how the methods and practices of BRA are poised to solve one of HPC’s most pernicious puz-
zles, the dark room problem (Mumford 1992; Sims 2017; see also the commentary on Clark 2013). But, 
in passing, we will address how BRA provides us with additional interpretational tools to understand 
behavior, and how BRA complements HPC-explanations such that we may distinguish how-possibly 
from how-actually explanations. If BRA contributes in these ways, then although HPC exceeds BRA 
in explanatory scope and subsumes its answers to what- and why-questions, there are reasons to be-
lieve that the development of satisfying three-level explanations involves a combination of resources 
from both modeling frameworks. 
Recall that, from the perspective of HPC, a cognizer behaves as it does in order to minimize pre-
diction error. It can do so either by adjusting its represented predictions about what happens in the 
environment so that they better fit the incoming sensory data, or by acting in order to make the 
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world match its predictions. Minimization of prediction error therefore can come in both directions of 
mind-world-fit. In the fleeting, dynamic world which we inhabit, however, one particularly easy way 
to ensure this kind of fit is to seek an evenly heated, silent, dark place which deprives the system of 
any sensory stimulation whatsoever, and to predict that nothing about this place will change. In such 
a “dark room”, the error for predicting that everything will stay the same is minimized—because ex 
hypothesi, nothing ever changes. Therefore, seeking such a dark room would appear to be a cognizer’s 
best strategy for prediction-error minimization. Evidently, however, there is a mismatch between this 
strategy and the ways in which biological cognizers actually behave: In the real world, we avoid such 
dark rooms for much of our lives. HPC seems unable to explain why cognizers are found playing 
bridge in living rooms, chasing mates in noisy clubs, listening in lecture halls, navigating the woods 
and busy market streets, and so on. The erratic nature of such dynamic, complex, and chaotic environ-
ments increases the chance that predictions will fail. Still, we prefer them over dark rooms. The fact 
that real-world cognizers are regularly found in dynamic, unpredictable environments challenges the 
adequacy of the generic HPC-answer to why-questions: cognitive systems do what they do because it 
minimizes prediction error. The best strategy for doing just that—going into the dark room—appears 
to be widely ignored.6
Can HPC-theorists explain why cognitive systems avoid dark rooms, and instead behave in far 
more interesting ways? Several HPC-theorists have tried to explain why certain features of our cogni-
tive architecture lead us to avoid dark rooms. For example, Andy Clark argues:
[C]hange, motion, exploration, and search are themselves valuable for creatures living in worlds 
where resources are unevenly spread and new threats and opportunities continuously arise. This 
means that change, motion, exploration, and search themselves become predicted. (Clark 2013, p. 
193)
Hohwy similarly argues that predictions about surprisal rates of an internalized model—so called 
“hyper-priors”—are what keep us out of dark rooms: 
[W]e don’t end up in dark rooms. We end up in just the range of situations we are expected to 
end up in on average. It is true we minimize prediction error and in this sense get rid of surprise. 
But this happens against the background of models of the world that do not predict high surprisal 
states, such as the prediction that we chronically inhabit a dark room. (Hohwy 2013, p. 87)
Finally, Schwartenbeck et al. 2013 strike a similar chord when they analyze exploration as a com-
parison between two different models the agent has of itself: the agent predicts that it will perform 
diverse actions in the future, compares these predictions to the actions it is currently performing, and 
if there is a mismatch, acts in order to minimize the prediction error. 
On each one of these responses, dark rooms are avoided because the sensory stimuli encountered 
in such rooms diverge from the predicted stimuli. Notably, saying that change, motion, exploration, 
search, future acts and surprisal states themselves become predicted is tantamount to saying that they 
are internally represented at some level of the hierarchy. Thus, responses of this type can be thought to 
be internalistic: It is an internal feature of the system that contributes to the avoidance of dark rooms. 
As such, this response is well in line with HPC’s focus on the algorithmic level: it seems easy to encode 
such a prediction as, for example, a prior probability at a particular level of the processing hierarchy. 
But there is reason to be unsatisfied with any internalistic response insofar as the likelihood of these 
6 According to Schwartenbeck et al. 2013, the dark room problem brings together two questions. First, why does the imperative to minimize prediction 
error not lead us to seek dark rooms? Second, how does HPC motivate the active exploration of new states? Both are, however, entangled: If there 
is a good answer to the second question and if that answer can be generalized, an answer to the first question is in reach; and any answer to the first 
question must, if it is adequately detailed, suggest an answer to the second question. Pace Schwartenbeck et al. 2013, we therefore treat these questions 
together.
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internalistic predictions themselves can be adjusted. It is accurate that going into a dark room would 
increase prediction error on the level where change, motion, exploration, etc. are predicted, but it 
would seem to simultaneously decrease prediction error on lower levels of the hierarchy which are 
closer to the sensorimotor periphery: whenever a cognizer is situated in the dark room, predicting 
that everything will remain dark produces no error at these lower levels. Thus, a question remains: at 
which hierarchical level should prediction error be minimized? 
As long as both predictions about sensory input and surprisal rates etc. are malleable, no answer 
follows by necessity. Should the higher level predictions change so as to fit the incoming sensory data 
in a dark room? Or should the higher level predictions remain fixed, so that the system moves away 
from the dark room so as to bring the incoming sensory information in line with the higher level 
prediction? The internalist’s answer would be: act in such a way that the error for higher-level predic-
tions is minimized. But an equally adequate strategy would seem to be: lower the precision estimates 
associated with these predictions while staying in the dark room. Why shouldn’t an agent decrease the 
strength of its predictions that the world will change, that it will perform diverse acts in the future, 
or that it will inhabit high surprisal states? Insofar as any one of these strategies would lead to the 
avoidance of dark rooms, it is unclear why the internalist response should be preferred.7 At the same 
time, it is unclear why exactly this choice is to be preferred over the alternative of staying in the dark 
room. In other words, any of the proposed models, understood in such a way that the predictions are 
all malleable, might explain why an organism left the dark room (if it did); but they can equally well 
explain why an organism stayed in the dark room (if it does).8
There is an extended (or embodied) counterpart to the internalistic response that may be better 
suited to avoiding dark rooms. According to this extended view, some predictions or priors are kept 
stable by tying them to fixed features of the organism or its environment. For example, Karl Friston 
expresses it as follows:
[E]very organism (from viruses to vegans) can be regarded as a model of its econiche, which has 
been optimized to predict and sample from that econiche. [...] This means that a dark room will af-
ford low levels of surprise if, and only if, the agent has been optimized by evolution (or neurodevel-
opment) to predict and inhabit it. Agents that predict rich stimulating environments will find the 
“dark room” surprising and will leave at the earliest opportunity. This would be a bit like arriving at 
the football match and finding the ground empty. (Friston et al. 2012, p. 3)
Crucially, on this response, “model” encompasses the system’s “interpretive disposition, morphol-
ogy, and neural architecture, and as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied organ-
ism and the embedding environment” (Friston et al. 2012, p. 6). This answer is not fully internalistic, 
but mixes internal and external aspects. Specifically, it assumes a matching of external factors, such 
as the configuration of the ecological niche an embodied cognitive system inhabits, with the internal 
model the organism has of that niche. On this extended response, we do not dwell in dark rooms be-
cause we are embodied agents that need to sustain homeostasis in a world where means and resources 
are unevenly spread in a changing environment (Klein in press), and we represent the world as such.9
This extended response is better suited to answering the dark room problem than the internalist 
alternative, because some of the model’s predictions are in fact ineligible for Bayesian updating: an 
animal’s morphology or fit to its econiche cannot be altered in the same quick way as its internal rep-
7 This kind of uncertainty affects any solution that relies on a comparison between two represented probability distributions where both can be altered. 
In order to minimize the Kullback-Leibler-Distance between them (and thereby minimize prediction error or free energy), either one of the com-
pared distributions can be altered. Defenders of an internalistic response to the dark room problem choose to alter distributions at lower hierarchical 
levels over distributions at higher levels, such that the organism has to act in order to match the input to these novel predictions.
8 See Klein in press for further critique of current solutions to the dark room problem.
9 Here, we focus on a reading where body and environment not merely influence a cognitive model but are actual parts of this model. We believe that 
such views can be found in Friston et al. 2012 and arguably in Bruineberg et al. forthcoming.
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resentations. For this reason, the argument against the purely internalistic answer outlined above does 
not apply: if some of the predictions of change, motion, exploration, and search are embodied rather 
than represented, they necessarily remain fixed. Thus, there is only one way for such agents to act, as 
they cannot adjust these embodied priors.10 For embodied systems, moving into a dark room will not 
decrease the likelihood of predictions of change, exploration, motion, nor change or alter their influ-
ence on behavior. Rather, these predictions are anchored in the body and its adaptation to the specific 
econiche of the organism (see also Bruineberg et al. forthcoming). Therefore, going into a dark room 
is not an option for any systems not adapted to caves; anything but sessile cave dwellers will inherently 
prefer dynamic environments.
By adopting an extended or embodied solution to the dark room problem, HPC departs from the 
brain-centric focus advocated by some of its proponents (e.g. Hohwy 2013). Unfortunately, this has 
the disadvantage of blurring a cognitive system’s boundaries. By viewing a system’s morphology and 
econiche as being part-and-parcel of its “model” of the environment, we lose the clear demarcation 
between the evidence that is available to the system and what this is evidence for (see Hohwy 2016 
as well as Hohwy 2017, and Clark 2017). Intuitively, there should be a difference between predictions 
made and the evidence that is used to evaluate them. Hohwy 2016 expresses this view when he argues 
that there should be a tightly woven evidentiary blanket which makes part of the world, as well as 
our own bodies, cognitively unavailable to us—their properties are to be inferred but are not directly 
available or immediately known. If morphology and ecological niche are themselves part of the model, 
however, this evidentiary blanket is lost. Therefore, this solution is unlikely to be attractive to those 
proponents of HPC who hope to retain a clear distinction between predictive mind and predicted 
world (see also Hohwy 2013). 
Is there a way to retain the sharp boundary between internal and external while also getting the 
benefits of the extended response? Here, the tools and methods of BRA might complement the ones 
of HPC. BRA is purpose-built for specifying the task environments inhabited by particular cognitive 
systems. Indeed, BRA-theorists have developed specialized techniques with which to formalize as-
sumptions, including about the nature of the hypothesis space being considered; the prior knowledge 
possessed; the likelihood of experiencing particular stimuli given that certain hypotheses are true for 
an environment; and perhaps most importantly, the relative costs or benefits of particular actions in a 
particular environment (Anderson 1991; Oaksford and Chater 2007). Recall that proponents of BRA 
invoke Bayes’ rule to compute posterior probability distributions over a space of, for example, possible 
causes of a particular visual stimulus. Thus, they assume that real-world behavior depends not only on 
an estimation of which causes are the most probable, but also on a calculation of which course of ac-
tion is the most prudent. Indeed, behavioral actions typically have consequences that should influence 
whether or not they are actually performed: to any villainous inhabitant of Metropolis, erroneously 
classifying Superman as a bird (leading to a false feeling of security, detection, and swift justice) will be 
more costly than erroneously classifying a bird as Superman (which merely incurs ridicule). For this 
reason, even if the posterior probability of “It’s a bird!” is high, the villain’s best course of action might 
be to declare “It’s Superman!” in order to avoid swift justice. Notably, Bayesian Decision Theory may 
be used to specify how posterior probability distributions should be combined with cost functions that 
formalize such consequences, so as to minimize the expected costs to the organism. Proponents of the 
BRA modeling framework regularly incorporate such cost functions into their computational-level 
characterizations of human and animal behavior (for discussion see e.g. Gershman and Daw 2012).
Some HPC-theorists are averse to invoking formal constructs such as cost functions that go be-
yond the calculation of probably distributions—some actively avoid them or think that they can do 
without (see Schwartenbeck et al. 2013 and Friston et al. 2012). But there are reasons to think this 
10 That is, given the clash between sensory input and the predictions of search and change, only one particular probability distribution can be altered in 
order to reduce the relevant Kullback-Leibler-Distance, as the other is not subject to adjustment.
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aversion is ill-advised. First, cost functions are just the kind of formal construct that may be needed 
to add precision to Clark’s rather intuitive appeal to “change, motion, exploration, and search” and 
related proposals by other HPC-theorists. Whereas dark-room-seeking behavior could be associated 
with a high cost to the organism, explorative behavior might be rewarded. In this way, BRA provides 
formal interpretational tools that help to describe why going into a dark room is in fact unreasonable 
given a dynamic environment where resources are unevenly spread. HPC might have formal tools to 
model under which circumstances an organism does not go into the dark room. But what is lacking 
is a tool for evaluating the extent to which this behavior can be seen as reasonable or prudent. As well 
as adding further formal tools to the Bayesian toolkit, BRA and Bayesian Decision Theory together 
provide an interpretational tool for understanding behavior. These interpretational tools can be used 
to supplement the suspicions of HPC-theorists that dark-room-dwelling would be detrimental to an 
organism, by precisely modeling the system’s behavior in relation to its environment in a way that the 
customary tools and concepts of HPC cannot. At the same time, these tools do not require that a 
cognitive system’s body and econiche themselves be viewed as a “model”. Rather, bodily features and 
environmental constraints are encoded as costs and benefits that are poised to influence the relevant 
system’s behavior. 
Thus supplemented by the tools of BRA and Bayesian Decision Theory, the HPC modeling frame-
work has a way of explaining why cognizers generally avoid dark rooms, while retaining a clear dis-
tinction between cognizers and their environment. However, some HPC-theorists reject this story as 
they maintain that as long as we minimize surprisal in our world, exploration and high-utility-gaining 
states come naturally. For example, Schwartenbeck et al. 2013 write that:
[M]inimizing surprise leads naturally to concepts such as exploration and novelty bonuses. In this 
approach, agents infer a policy that minimizes surprise by minimizing the difference (or relative 
entropy) between likely and desired outcomes, which involves both pursuing the goal-state that has 
the highest expected utility (often termed “exploitation”) and visiting a number of different goal-
states (“exploration”). (Schwartenbeck et al. 2013, p. 1)
Views like these bring us to another proposal of how BRA contributes to HPC, because they raise 
the question: why does such behavior lead to the highest expected utility? One can only say that it 
maximizes expected utility if a model of the environment is implicitly presumed where such behavior 
does maximize expected utility. The tools of BRA are ideally suited to make this implicit model of the 
organism-environment-coupling explicit. 
We also believe that including the formal tools of BRA circumvents another problem of HPC-ac-
counts: only HPC-accounts with fixed and stable (or at least specific) priors can account for observed 
behavior which is stable across organisms of a species. But how do such fixed priors come to be? 
HPC-theorists ought to give some explanation as to why we have the priors we have which explain the 
behavior we show. Giving such explanations often involves references to the environment in which an 
organism evolved and developed. But Hohwy (Hohwy 2013; see also Bowers and Davis 2012) warns 
us of Bayesian just-so stories, where we merely hypothesize about how a prior might arise without ac-
tually checking for evidence for such stories:
The challenge […] is to avoid just-so stories. That requires avoiding priors and likelihoods that 
are posited only in order to make them fit an observed phenomenon. To avoid just-so stories any 
particular ordering of priors and likelihoods should be supported by independent evidence, which 
would suggest that this ordering holds across domains. (Hohwy 2013, p. 94)
One source of such independent evidence for specific priors might come from BRA, where we 
model the environment with its specific features, distribution of resources, and the costs and bene-
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fits for certain actions. This then might serve as a tool for distinguishing Bayesian just-so stories or 
how-possibly-explanations from how-actually-explanations. Supplementing a successful HPC-story 
with some of BRA’s tools then gives us a broader Bayesian explanation of the behavior we exhibit and 
the mind that brings it about.11
Therefore, we believe that BRA complements HPC. First, because only HPC-solutions where some 
priors are fixed or ineligible for Bayesian updating can explain why all nontroglobionitic animals 
avoid dark rooms. A prominent solution for this is an extended account where certain stable features 
of both organism and environment are part of the organism’s model, thereby fixing certain priors. 
However, this endangers the strong evidentiary blanket, which some HPC-theorists like to main-
tain. In order to preserve this blanket, the tools of BRA can be used to explain why certain behaviors 
come with certain costs and benefits and are therefore performed. Second, because BRA provides an 
interpretational tool, telling us why certain behaviors are prudent. Third, if we avoid cost-functions 
and argue that minimizing surprisal comes with high expected utility, our best evidence for this is an 
implicit model of the environment, which can best be made explicit by using BRA. Fourth, if HPC-ex-
planations rely on specific priors, BRA may help us to distinguish Bayesian how-possibly-explanations 
(just-so stories) from how-actually-explanations. We take these reasons as sufficient for advocating a 
combination of BRA and HPC.
5  Conclusion
We have sought to clarify how the Bayesian Rational Analysis and Hierarchical Predictive Coding 
modeling frameworks relate, and did so by comparing them vis-à-vis Marr’s influential three-level 
conception of explanation in cognitive science. Whereas BRA-theorists answer questions at the com-
putational level of analysis only, HPC-theorists focus primarily on the algorithmic level, while also 
addressing the computational and implementational levels. Given that answering questions at the 
computational level is insufficient for full-fledged explanation, the methods and practices of HPC can 
appear to offer a far more likely avenue to explanatory success. Nevertheless, because BRA (i) appears 
well-suited for supporting a solution to the dark room problem due to its specific tools and concepts 
for modeling task environments, (ii) provides an interpretational tool (iii) allows us to make implicit 
assumptions about the structure of the environment explicit, and (iv) helps to distinguish how-possi-
bly- from how-actually-explanations, it appears that three-level explanations of behavior and cogni-
tion are most likely to be forthcoming if the Bayesian Rational Analysis and Hierarchical Predictive 
Coding frameworks are combined.
11 We are grateful to Wanja Wiese for discussions which inspired this section about Bayesian just-so stories.
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